Russia’s Economy in the 2020s: A Cheerless Future

Russia’s leadership is not interested in economic growth. Everybody only wants things not to turn to the worse.

Back in 2013 and 2015, I wrote two pieces for the Aspen Review Central Europe arguing that President Putin’s return to the Kremlin in 2012 marked the beginning of a ‘lost decade’ in Russia’s economic development1 and reiterating this statement after the first consequences of Moscow’s aggression against Ukraine became clear.2 Today it seems I was right: in the last ten years, from 2009 to 2018, Russia’s economy grew in real terms by 8.8%, or by 0.85% annually on average,3 the nominal wages in dollar terms increased from 588 to 697 dollars per month,4 but the official poverty rate inched up from 13.0 to 13.1% of the country’s population.5

Not one of the ambitious tasks the government put forward ten years ago was achieved, as Putin’s
long-time dream either to catch-up with Portugal in terms of per capita GDP or overtake Germany as the world’s fifth-largest economy remained unrealized. But at the same time, all these economic shortcomings have not caused any critical dissent in Russia, allowing its longtime leader to be reelected in 2018 and redraft the country’s Constitution in 2020 to stay in power for life.

Two Important Points Became Clear about Russia’s Economy over the Last Five Years.

On the one hand, it appeared that it has a huge capacity for absorbing external shocks: it was the oil that dipped to around 30 dollars per barrel in 2016, and the Western sanctions that were thought would destroy Russia’s finances—but at the end saw the federal budget reporting record surpluses both in 2018 and 2019 with the government reserves restored at around 125 billion dollars. These adjustments came from the introduction of the floating exchange rate for the ruble back in 2014 that allowed the Russian currency to lose its value in case oil prices fall and secure the government’s ability to collect almost the same amounts of rubles into the treasury (around 40% of Russian budget income originate from custom duties nominated in dollars, and up to 20% comes from profit tax that rises when domestic production costs fall alongside with the ruble exchange rate).

It should also be mentioned that the economic standstill caused by declining real disposable incomes (which are now around 11% lower than in 2013)6 became an ultimate weapon for combating inflation that in 2019 fell to 3% simply because any price hikes immediately resulted in a dramatic fall in customer demand. The sanctions and the ‘counter-sanctions’ produced some stimulus for developing domestic agricultural and industrial production oriented at low-quality low-priced goods being consumed by the lower middle class. So, as I argued last year, today Russia’s leadership is actually not interested in economic growth at all since everybody just wants things not to turn to the worse, and the stagnating economy secures Putin’s beloved ‘stability’.7

The sanctions and the ‘counter-sanctions’ produced some stimulus for developing domestic agricultural and industrial production oriented at low-quality low-priced goods being consumed by the lower middle class.

On the other hand, the developments over these years have confirmed my thesis about the ‘lost decade’ that started after 2012. One would be wrong if she or he believes the Russian government did not try to push the economic growth during all this time. Quite to the contrary—the budget outlays for ‘the development of the national economy’ doubled between 2011 and 2019 to reach 2.64 trillion rubles (40.7 billion dollars) per year;8 both in 2012 and 2018 Putin issued a series of decrees establishing ambitious economic goals; and during 2018-2019 over a dozen ‘national projects’ with an unprecedented price tag of 21 trillion rubles (325 billion dollars) for 2019-2024 were announced by the Kremlin.

But it seems nothing can help: for making the economy ‘grow’ by 1.3% in 2019 the Russian authorities decided just to change the management of Rosstat, the country’s statistical office, as well as the methodological backgrounds of statistical analysis9 (I would say that the statistical manipulations has become very widespread in recent years: e.g., when in 2015 it became obvious that the highway construction programs failed, the Russian road network was ‘adjusted’ by adding the streets in the
cities to its overall length).

I would say the Russian economy simply cannot absorb the money it generates: in 2018 public commercial companies generated more than 5 trillion rubles in profits, and paid out more than 4 trillion as dividends to the shareholders,10 trying to reinvest as little money as possible. Under such conditions there was little hope for an economic revival to happen anytime soon.

The Lack of an Industrial Sector

First, I would like to recall that few experts made enough efforts to find out what the sources of the economic growth in Russia were in the 2000s. Most of the people simply believed there were enormous oil revenues that pushed the economy forward. But in this case, two crucial elements are neglected.

On the one hand, it should be mentioned that during the first two of Putin’s terms in power the investments into fixed assets stood at a very low level, close to 16% of GDP (compared to the Soviet figures of 41-43%).

The money that was saved due to such ‘economizing’ went to the personal consumption that fueled the aggregate demand. In the 2010s the terrible situation in road construction, electricity networks, bridges and other infrastructure shifted the investment up to 20-22% thus cutting the share of personal expenditures.

On the other hand, in the early Putin years there were many industries with high growth potential that never existed before: in 2000-2008 around 70% of GDP increase came from wholesale and retail trade, lodging and restaurants, residential construction, banking and insurance business, mobile telecommunications and the development of Internet networks.11

The Russian economy simply cannot absorb the money it generates: in 2018 public commercial companies generated more than 5 trillion rubles in profits, and paid out more than 4 trillion as dividends to the shareholders.

By early 2010 all these sectors had become saturated (today Russia has more sim-cards per 100 people than any other European country, and the tariffs are the lowest on the continent) without any other industries being able to secure future growth. Once again, the Russian economy can generate money, but it lacks the industrial sector that can consume it: up to 90% of office equipment, telecommunication devices and mobile phones, as well as medicines and healthcare devices are imported.

The Russian economy can generate money, but it lacks the industrial sector that can consume it: up to 90% of office equipment, telecommunication devices and mobile phones, as well as medicines are imported.

Russia can export its resources and buy what it needs—but one should realize that the country is simply poor: if the overall value of oil and natural gas exports for 2019 (288 billion dollars) is equally divided between Russia’s citizens, everyone would receive 1,964 dollars per year, while the same calculation for Qatar would leave every Qatari citizen with 262,400 dollars in cash.12 With the oil prices plunging due to the covid-19 pandemic, Russia-Saudi oil quarrels and the upcoming global economic recession, the Russian people will become more and more preoccupied with their daily survival while all the modernization plans will be put aside.

Second, Putin’s policies from the very beginning were oriented on ‘re-storing order’ in his country. For the Russian economy it meant that it began to be monitored and managed by the ever-increasing number of bureaucrats and officials (by 2013 they were twice as numerous than in 1999). Moreover, both the Ministry of the Interior and the Federal Security Service started to investigate the businessmen and their commercial deals pretending they were trying not to pay taxes, orchestrating sham transactions, and even organizing criminal communities. By 2012, nine of out ten criminal cases that were opened by either the police or the investigative committee did not come to court came—first of all because the policemen accepted bribes or simply took over the businesses that belonged to the accused.

In the 2010s in Russia, the active or retired MVD or FSB officers became the main dealmakers in different sectors of the national economy and, at the same time, the most corrupt officials in the country. In 2016, a 38-year old police colonel Zakharchenko was arrested in one of his apartments where 8.5 billion rubles (or 127 million dollars) were found both in cash and gold;13 in 2019, the FSB Colonel Cherkalin was taken with 12 billion rubles (or 185.5 million dollars) found in his three apartments and houses in and around Moscow.14 With the courts acquitting less than 1% of all the accused15 the police and security services now seem to absolutely dominate the business landscape in the country.

The regulations are becoming increasingly strict, taxes are increasing, and economic freedom is diminishing. Mikhail Mishustin, who was sworn in last week as new Russian Prime Minister, serving previously as the Minister for Taxation, once said that people are ‘Russia’s new oil’ meaning that after the oil revenues declined, the state should squeeze its subjects to get additional money into the budget. I believe that such an approach cannot create an investor-friendly environment that stimulates the economy to grow.

Over the last years, Russia lost tens of billions of dollars due to extensive capital flight—and I would argue that this outflow became bigger from one half-decade to another.

A Massive Outflow of People

The third major challenge to the Russian economy seems to be its openness to the world. Over the last years, Russia lost tens of billions of dollars due to extensive capital flight—and I would argue that this outflow became bigger from one half-decade to another (in 2004-2008 the country lost 59 billion rubles annually on average, while in 2009-2013 the figure rose to 1.75 trillion rubles, and in 2014-2018 it reached 3.71 trillion rubles per year—those figures equal 0.21%, 2.45 and 4.21% of Russia’s nominal GDP for those years, correspondingly).16

The capital outflow was caused primarily by the poor business environment and the pressure applied by both bureaucracy and security services; I would also say that since 2012 the most famous Russian oligarchs, who enjoyed very good and friendly relations with Putin himself, began to pull their fortunes out of the country, extensively buying European and American publicly traded companies, expensive real estate, sport clubs, and works of art (by 2018 at least half of the combined fortunes of Russia’s top ten richest people were transferred abroad).17

From the start of Putin’s rule until 2017 more than 2 million Russian citizens had left the country, and, if the trend continues, by the end of next year this exodus may exceed the biggest ever that happened.

Experiencing all this money drain, the Russian economy cannot feel itself healthy—but this is only one part of a much more complex problem. I am talking about a massive outflow of people that began in 2012 but which has become in recent years one of the most acute issues in Russia. By several estimates, from the start of Putin’s rule until 2017 more than 2 million Russian citizens had left the country, and, if the trend continues, by the end of next year this exodus may exceed the biggest ever that happened with Russia between 1917 and 192218.

My own research made several years ago suggests that the Russians who left the country in recent years (1990s included) now control overseas assets that are bigger than the entire GDP of the Russian Federation.19 Those who decided to move out are not of course Putin’s security guards and police officers but the most educated and business-minded people in the country, most of them young and self-made. This, I would argue, makes the Russian economic growth in the future even more problematic since there is a much higher probability that the money will return to the country than those people will.

By the start of 2020, one was able to say that Russia had found its ‘equilibrium’, or, as the top financial officials used to say back in 2017, ‘a new normal’. It meant that the government commanded enough funds to secure at least some support inside all social groups; that the state-owned corporations produced enough profit to be taxed and channelled into both federal and regional budgets; and the bureaucracy and security services believed their positions were strong enough to obtain their share of the national wealth for the years to come. The government masterfully used the pressure from abroad to legitimate economic hardships so therefore there is little room for an organized domestic opposition. This changed all of a sudden, however, in recent months as the global economy stalled, oil prices collapsed and most of the Russian economy suffered from the covid-19 quarantine imposed almost everywhere in the country.20

Will the Russian economy collapse due to recent events? I would rather say it has just begun to muddle its way toward another ‘new normal’ that will make its economy even more primitive but not as inclined to crumble. I will try to explain what Putin’s strategy looks like these days even though experts believe he simply does not have anyone to follow.

A Massive Wave of Bankruptcies

During March 2020, the oil prices fell from around $50 to less than $25/barrel and at some points the situation looked catastrophic as the Russian oil was priced ‘negatively’ in Europe (which means that in Rotterdam the Urals brand was valued at $10.6/barrel as the extraction costs, pipeline and maritime transportation as well as the taxes the oil companies were obliged to pay to the Russian government made up to $16/barrel).21 I would argue, however, that even under such conditions the average price for Russian oil still stood at $48.2/barrel during the first quarter22 which means the economy might well survive on it.

The reserves accumulated by the government ($123.3 billion as of March 1)23 were still sufficient to cover the emerging budget deficit and refinance the shortcomings in the regional budgets. The ‘closing’ of major Russian cities and termination of dozens of types of businesses due to covid-19 pandemic (which may last well into May) will mean a major blow to the small and mid-sized private businesses all over the country that employ up to 18.5 million people24, or roughly a quarter of Russia’s workforce.

Will the Russian economy collapse due to recent events? I would rather say it has just begun to muddle its way toward another ‘new normal’ that will make its economy even more primitive but not as inclined to crumble.

Unlike Western governments, Russian leadership did not announce any huge efforts either to distribute cash payments among the general public or to support the affected businesses (the only relief that was made are the ‘tax loans’ which means businesses can postpone their tax payments for six months, but have to eventually pay later).25 I would assume that the most crucial result of the recent crisis will be a massive wave of bankruptcies in the service sectors followed by a huge redistribution of property caused by the taking over of affected businesses either by state companies or by ‘commercial’ entities controlled by Moscow or local bureaucrats.

By 2021, the share of private businesses in the Russian economy will be at least halved—and this will be another step in creating the kind of ‘corporate state’ Putin is trying to build.26 After the redistribution is conducted, the state funds will be provided via the state-owned banks to the businesses which are already in the ‘right’ hands. The Russian economy will finally become almost entirely nationalized. I would also argue that quite a significant stock of money will be returned to Russia by many wealthy businessmen and bureaucrats as plenty of cheap purchases emerge in the country and the new laws tighten the requirements for public servants on double citizenship and possessing overseas assets. My general conclusion would be that Russia will emerge from the unfolding crisis as a much poorer country, but still remain firm on the path Putin chose for it.

What might then the forecast for the approaching new decade look like? For responding to this question, one should look at several major lines of the Russian government’s economic strategy.

Unlike Western governments, Russian leadership did not announce any huge efforts either to distribute cash payments among the general public or to support the affected businesses.

It seems obvious that Russia looks forward to making even more use of its natural resources. Putin addresses the issues of selling, delivering, or transiting Russia’s natural gas at almost 70% of his high-level meetings with foreign officials whether in Moscow or Sochi or abroad (even natural gas made up only 9.8% of Russia’s exports in 2019).27 As the oil prices fall, Russia has nothing else to rely on (in 2019 its oil, oil products and natural gas accounted for 63.3% of its exports28 and this share has not changed significantly in recent years).

All its other exports are also affected by the falling global demand while its permanent supplies are barely profitable if one takes into account that around a third of them go to the countries that will never pay for the supplies). There is consequently no chance Russia will become ‘independent’ of oil and gas exports even in the long run—at least for the 2020s everyone can be certain there will be no change here.

How to Pacify the People

There is no serious doubt today that Russia will remain a large exporter of oil and gas in 20-25 years from now, so I expect Moscow will do its best to restore its relationships with Saudi Arabia and other oil-producing nations in order to stabilize the oil prices at $40/barrel at least which is a realistic task taking into account the inevitable revival in the global economy in 2021 and beyond. The ruble exchange rate will decrease to Rub100/$1 and even lower in 2022-2023 but the inflation will remain in single digits due to the depressed domestic demand.

For obvious reasons, Russia will further cut imports and continue its ‘import-substitution’ policies introducing more and more domestically produced low-quality products to the market. By 2022, real disposable incomes will decrease by around 20% compared to 2019—but the issue of unemployment will be mostly resolved and people will become accustomed to the ‘new normal’ as they became accustomed to the old ones.

I would also argue that the mainline of Putin’s new strategy will be to unleash the potential of the Russian Central Bank for covering the budget needs since it will become increasingly clear that the oil revenues cannot provide the funds needed for pacifying the people. The lowering of the Central Bank rate would also lighten the burden for private borrowers (today, the average Russian owes as much as 47.1% of her or his annual income to the banks and other credit companies).29

I would also argue that the main line of Putin’s new strategy will be to unleash the potential of the Russian Central Bank for covering the budget needs.

I would argue that this will be the most important economic difference between Russia of the 2020s and Russia of the 2000s and 2010s. In the 2000s, the country was able to accumulate impressive currency reserves and reserve funds that ceased to grow in the 2010s but were almost stable during most of the decade. Russia refrained, however, from increasing its government debt staying now at a mere Rub 14.4 trillion30 (13.5% of GDP, at least five to six times less than in any developed Western economy).

As the budget is in the red with disposable incomes falling, it is not a problem to inject at least 3 to 4% of GDP into the economy every year with no huge risk of facilitating inflation—and I have no doubt the Russian government will begin to do so already this or next year as the reserves are depleted with the oil price remaining low.

The practices of all developed nations suggest these days that the expanding central bank loans can be of vital importance for maintaining the economy afloat, so Russia will definitely follow suit fast since it has to channel more and more funds into its social programs. I cannot say how long this strategy will last and how it will be supplemented with the former means of maintaining financial stability but I am absolutely certain that it will become a crucial feature of Russia’s economic reality of the 2020s.

One can also insist with a high degree of confidence that the Russian government will be forced to channel more and more money into the social programs as its population is aging and the fertility rates remain very low (Putin already focused on this issue in both of his latest annual addresses to Parliament). It is even more apparent now because it is clear that President Putin will remain in power at least for a major part of the coming decade, and in a situation of economic stagnation he will need to appease his electorate by some ‘gifts’ from the budget.

One might expect several new programs to be introduced that address poverty and inequality because the government has to do its best to prevent poverty rates from rising fast (there is no chance for them to stabilize or be lowered, as Putin promised so many times). At the same time, as one can see even during the crisis days that Russia will not lower taxes on businesses, so the business environment will not improve at all. The authorities will introduce campaigns of fighting corruption for responding to the public attention to the issue, but these measures will target only mid-level corrupt officials and will not address the abuses of power by the highest functionaries.

Tighten State Control over Citizens

The Russian government will develop different cases for use of information technologies which today are known under the notion of ‘digitalization’ (цифровизация). The main goal of these measures will be to tighten state control over citizens: to track all payment card transactions for obtaining more taxes; to find out how many apartments are unofficially rented for collecting more fees; to look over the transborder and interregional movement of people; to automate the collection of driving fines, etc. I would predict that in the coming three to five years there will be a number of attempts to marry Russia’s preindustrial economy with postindustrial technologies.

The government will invest significant money into this, trying to produce ‘entirely Russian’ software, and control the Internet—but I do not expect these efforts to be effective; much more likely they will undermine those sectors of the Russian economy that are currently quite modern and competitive (one of the seminal examples may be seen very recently as the government tried to regulate the country’s largest email operator and search engine, Yandex).31

It is clear that President Putin will remain in power at least for a major part of the coming decade, and in a situation of economic stagnation he will need to appease his electorate by some ‘gifts’ from the budget.

Responding to the rising human capital outflow and growing number of pensioners, the government will stimulate immigration—first of all from the former Soviet republics of Central Asia. The Eurasian Economic Union that Putin has been building since 2011 provides all necessary frameworks for that. Russia has already became a temporary home to no less than 12 million workers from post-Soviet countries32 and a number of reports made by Moscow-based think-tanks suggest many more will be welcomed.33 This trend, I would argue, reflects the complete inability of the Russian economic elite to engrain the technological advanced methods of production into the national economy. The growing immigration is also needed for recruiting new citizens that will be loyal to the regime while allowing the more educated and independent dissenters to leave making the political system more ‘stable’.

While promoting further, however, the goals of achieving economic ‘stability’ and political ‘sovereignty’, Russia will become poorer and less developed during all the 2020s. The economic downturn of 2020-2011 will deprive it of up to 10% of its GDP and, what is much more important, no recovery growth will follow since the oil prices will remain depressed and business confidence will hit historic lows. The average growth rates for 2020-2025 will be around zero with some more dismal years of stagnation to come. Real disposable incomes may decrease by up to 15% during the decade. I expect no structural changes or modernization efforts to happen in the country in the coming years.

The most problematic issue these days, of course, is the question as to whether some political changes might be expected in Russia. I would cautiously argue that these do not look all that probable in coming years—for several reasons. On the one hand, the immediate result of the ongoing crisis will be a decrease in the power struggle inside the Russian elites. No one these days is interested in assuming more power since it comes at the price of a greater responsibility—therefore the top bureaucrats would rather declare someone like the current Prime Minister Mishustin or the Moscow Mayor Sobyanin responsible for either the economic troubles or the growing number of covid-19 deaths and make use of them than to accuse Putin of policy shortcomings.

On the other hand, I find it hard to believe that the Russian people will revolt against the current policies since it has never happened before that the population of any of the post-Soviet states has become agitated by purely economic troubles.

There have been a number of cases when it stood up because of rigged elections (as it happened in Georgia in 2003, in Ukraine in 2004-2005, in Belarus in 2010 or in Russia in 2011), broken political promises (as in Ukraine in 2014), or even politically motivated violence (like the Gongadze killing in Ukraine in 2000), but it never consolidated against the economic hardships.

Russia is, as I called it a long time ago, ‘a society without citizens’,34 and this will not change any time soon. I expect the Constitution will be amended in a highly formal vote this summer, and all the upcoming elections will be held under some new rules that actually exclude the real chance for the people to elect the officials they prefer. I recently described this situation as something similar to the state of emergency that existed in Egypt from 1981 to 201235—an order that does not harm all that much the economic activity, but diminishes political freedoms. No one can predict how long it can last but I do not expect things to change until 2024 at the earliest.

Responding to the rising human capital outflow and growing number of pensioners, the government will stimulate immigration—first of all from the former Soviet republics of Central Asia.

Around four years ago, I argued that Russia of the 2010s would be a country with a non-growing economy contrary to Russia of the 2000s which resembled East Asian tigers for a while—and added that after this standstill a long and continuous downfall would in all probability follow.36 It seems I was right that time: in the 2020s Russia will not crumble; it will not become a place of revolts and revolutions—its economy will slowly deteriorate, its people will try either to accustom to the new conditions or to leave, its political life will actually disappear. The country will turn from a territory of hope into one of disillusionment—and no one can tell these days for sure when and how this may change.


  1. See: Inozemtsev, Vladislav. “The Beginning of a Lost Decade” in: Aspen Review Central Europe, 2013, No 4, pp. 66–68.
  2. See: Inozemtsev, Vladislav. “Russia’s Economy: A Changing Trend” in: Aspen Review Central Europe, 2015, No 3, pp. 82–88.
  3. Based on World Bank data, see: data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?locations=RU, site retrieved Jan. 18, 2020.
  4. Calculated after Rosstat data using the official weighted exchange rates for both 2009 and 2018, see: www.gks.ru/free_doc/new_site/population/trud/sr-zarplata/t1.docx, site retrieved Jan. 18, 2020.
  5. See Rosstat data: http://www.gks.ru/free_doc/new_site/population/bednost/tabl/2-3.doc, site retrieved Jan. 18, 2020.
  6. See: “Реальные доходы россиян упали пятый год подряд” (“The Real Disposable Incomes of the Russian Citizens Declined for the Fifth Consecutive Year”) at the RBC newspaper website: www.rbc.ru/economics/25/01/2019/5c4af2c39a7947badf2d4e74 [in Russian], site retrieved Jan. 18, 2020.
  7. See: Inozemtsev, Vladislav. “Putin Doesn’t Care About Economic Growth” at the Project Syndicate website: www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/russia-economic-stagnation-prospects-by-vladislav-inozemtsev-2019-06, site retrieved Jan. 18, 2020.
  8. See: “Расходы бюджета РФ на национальную экономику вырастут до 2,64 трлн рублей в 2019 году“ (“Federal Budget Spendings on the Development of the National Economy to Rise to Rub 2.64 trln in 2019”) at Vesti Finance website: www.vestifinance.ru/articles/107167 [in Russian], site retrieved Jan. 18, 2020.
  9. See: “Медведев сменил главу Росстата” (“Medvedev Changes the Director of Rosstat”) at the RBC website: www.rbc.ru/society/24/12/2018/5c20d36d9a7947c9fed6ed23 [in Russian], site retrieved Jan. 18, 2020.
  10. See: Сарычева, Мария. “Российские компании выплатили рекордные дивиденды. Почему это плохой сигнал для экономики?” (Sarycheva, Maria. “The Russian Companies Paid Out Record Dividends: Why It’s a Bad Signal for the Economy?”) at the Forbes Russia website: www.forbes.ru/finansy-i-investicii/384233-rossiyskie-kompanii-vyplatili-rekordnye-dividendy-pochemu-eto-plohoy [in Russian], site retrieved Jan. 18, 2020.
  11. See: Иноземцев, Владислав. “Исчезнувшие источники роста” в: Бизнес-Журнал, 2017, No1-2, сс. 15–17 (Inozemtsev, Vladislav. “The Disappearing Engines for Growth” in: Business Journal, 2017, No. 1-2, pp. 15–17 [in Russian]).
  12. See: Иноземцев, Владислав. “Обещанного сорок лет ждут. Почему радужные обещания власти в принципе невыполнимы” (Inozemtsev, Vladislav. “It’s Never Long That Comes at Last: Why the Government’s Promises Are Absolutely Unfeasible”) at the Snob Magazine website: snob.ru/selected/entry/186342/ [in Russian], site retrieved Jan. 18, 2020.
  13. See: “Дело Дмитрия Захарченко” (“The Dmitry Zakharchenko Case”) at the Kommersant newspaper website: www.kommersant.ru/theme/2619 [in Russian], site retrieved Jan. 18, 2020.
  14. See: “Рекорд взяток Захарченко побит” (“Zakharchenko’s Bribery Record Broken”) at the Rosbalt information agency website: www.rosbalt.ru/moscow/2019/05/17/1781570.html [in Russian], site retrieved Jan. 18, 2020.
  15. See: Володина, Мария. “В 2019 году российские суды оправдали меньше 1% подсудимых” (Volodina, Maria. “In 2019 the Russian Courts Acquitted Less than 1 percent of the Accused”) at the Snob Magazine website: snob.ru/news/187669/ [in Russian], site retrieved Jan. 18, 2020.
  16. See: Иноземцев, Владислав. “[Об оттоке капитала]” (Inozemtsev, Vladislav. “[On the Capital Outflow”) at the Kremlevskiy Bezbashennik: t.me/kremlebezBashennik/4638 [in Russian], site retrieved Jan. 18, 2020.
  17. See: “Им не страшна национализация” (“They’re Not Afraid of Nationalization”) at the Forbes Russia website: www.forbes.ru/milliardery-photogallery/343801-imne-strashna-nacionalizaci-
    ya-10-milliarderov-s-naibolshimi [in Russian], site retrieved Jan. 18, 2020.
  18. See: Herbst, John and Erofeev, Sergei. The Putin Exodus: The New Russian Brain Drain, Washington (DC): Atlantic Council, 2019, p. 1.
  19. See: Inosemzew, Wladislaw. “Wer gehört zur „russischen Welt“?” in: Internationale Politik, 2014, No 6 (November-December), S. 97–98.
  20. As of 1 April 2020 only six out of eighty-five Russian regions had not introduced the State-at-Home orders, see: “Ярославская область в числе шести регионов без режима самоизоляции“ (“Yaroslavl Region Among Six Regions Without State-at-Home Regime”) at the Kommersant newspaper website: www.kommersant.ru/doc/4310543 [in Russian], site retrieved Apr. 2, 2020.
  21. See: “Цена российской нефти упала до нового рекорда в $10,5” (“The Price for Russian
    Oil Touches New Low of $10.5 [per barrel]”) at the RBC Daily newspaper website: www.rbc.
    ru/business/02/04/20205e85a9909a7947d8b20fbcf4 [in Russian], site retrieved Apr. 2, 2020.
  22. See: “Минфин раскрыл среднюю цену российской нефти за март” (“The Finance Ministry Unveil Russian Oil’s Average Price for March [2020]”) at the RBC Daily newspaper website: www.rbc.ru/economics/01/04/2020/5e84cc099a7947889c4ba151 [in Russian], site retrieved Apr. 2, 2020.
  23. See: “Объём Фонда национального благосостояния” (“National Wellbeing Fund Volume”)
    at Russia’s Finance Ministry website: www.minfin.ru/ru/document/?id_4=27068-obem_fonda_natsionalnogo_blagosostoyaniya [in Russian], site retrieved Apr. 2, 2020.
  24. See: “Cбербанк оценил долю занятых в малом и среднем бизнесе” (“Sberbank Estimates the Share of Employment in Small and Mid-Sized Businesses”) at the RBC Daily newspaper website:
    www.rbc.ru/economics/22/07/2019/5d3594ee9a79478645ac1102 [in Russian], site retrieved Apr. 2, 2020.
  25. See: Пятин, Александр. “Схема нового налога и законы о кредитах для бизнеса” (Pyatin, Alexander. “The New Tax Scheme and New Laws on Business Loans”) at the Forbes Russia website: www.forbes.ru/newsroom/biznes/396319-shema-novogonaloga-i-zakony-o-kreditah-
    dlya-biznesa-putin-razdalporucheniya [in Russian], site retrieved Apr. 2, 2020.
  26. For more details see: Inozemtsev, Vladislav. “The Zombie Nation Returns” in: The American Interest, 2019, January-February, Vol. XIV, No. 3, pp. 25–28.
  27. See: “Доходы РФ от экспорта трубопроводного газа в 2019 году упали на 15,3%, от нефти—на 6%” (“In 2019, Russia’s Revenues from Pipeline Gas Exports fell by 15.3 percent, from Oil—by 6 percent”) at the Prime Agency website: 1prime.ru/energy/20200211/830924885.html [in Russian], site retrieved Apr. 2, 2020.
  28. See: “Внешняя торговля России в 2019 году” (“Russia’s Foreign Trade in 2019”) at the Russian Trade web database: russian-trade.com/reports-and-reviews/2020-02/vneshnyaya-torgovlya-rossii-
    v-2019-godu/ [in Russian], site retrieved Apr. 2, 2020.
  29. See: “Аналитики назвали средний размер долга россиян перед банками” (“The Analysts Unveil the Average Amount of Debt Russians Owe to Banks”) at Izvestia newspaper website: iz.ru/966127/2020-01-20/analitiki-nazvali-srednii-razmer-dolga-rossiian-pered-bankami [in Russian], site retrieved Apr. 2, 2020.
  30. See: “Государственный долг Российской Федерации” (“Government Debt of the Russian Federation”) at the Electronic Budget web database: budget.gov.ru/epbs/faces/p/Бюджет/Государственный%20долг?_adf.ctrl-state=t5j9vpyn0_4&regionId=45 [in Russian], site retrieved Apr. 2, 2020.
  31. See: Inozemtsev, Vladislav. “The Yandex Affair: Insider Trading and Institutionalized State Control” at the Jamestown Foundation website: jamestown.org/program/the-yandex-affair-insider-trading-and-institutionalized-state-control/, site retrieved Jan. 18, 2020.
  32. See: Жуковский, Иван. “Как в Германии: сколько у нас мигрантов?” (Zhukovsky, Ivan. “As in Germany: How Many Migrants Do We Have?”) at the Gazeta.ru news outlet website: www.gazeta.ru/social/2019/10/10/12747578.shtml [in Russian], site retrieved Jan. 18, 2020.
  33. See: Ивахнюк, Ирина. Предложения к миграционной политике России до 2035 года,
    Москва: Центр стратегических разработок, 2017 (Ivakhnyuk, Irina. Propositions for Russia’s 2035 Migration Policy, Moscow: Center for Strategic Research, 2017) [in Russian]. See: Inozemtsev, Vladislav. “Russie, une société libre sous contrôle authoritaire” в: Le Monde diplomatique, 2010, No 10 (Octobre), pp. 4–5. See: Inozemtsev, Vladislav. “2020: Russia’s Historical Watershed” at the Riddle website: www.ridl.io/en/2020-russia-s-historical-watershed/, site retrieved Apr. 2, 2020.
  34. See: Inozemtsev, Vladislav. “Putin’s Self-Destructing Economy” in: The Washington Post, 2016, January 18, р. A15.
  35. See: Inozemtsev, Vladislav. “2020: Russia’s Historical Watershed” at the Riddle website: www.ridl.io/en/2020-russia-s-historical-watershed/, site retrieved Apr. 2, 2020.
  36. See: Inozemtsev, Vladislav. “Putin’s Self-Destructing Economy” in: The Washington Post, 2016, January 18, р. A15.

Vladislav Inozemtsev

is the founder and director at the Center for Post-Industrial Studies in Moscow. He chaired the Department for World Economy and International Trade at the Moscow State University’s School of Public Governance and taught at various universities, including MGIMO and the Higher School of Economics in Moscow. He is a member of the Russian International Affairs Council. Since 1991, he authored 15 books, four of which were translated into English. He regularly contributes to Vedomosti and RBCDaily newspapers in Moscow, as well El Pais, Internationale Politik, Süddeutsche Zeitung, Gazeta Wyborcza, The American Interest, Foreign Affairs and other periodicals in Europe and the U.S.

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